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Abstract
Following a brief review of some economic
theory relevant to the analysis ofnot-for-profit
theatre arts enterprises, the arguments
relating to the merits of continuing subsidies
to the British theatre arts arc considered with
respect to both production and consumption
benefit perspectives. These are framed around
the populist assertions 4tpically levelled
against and by advocates of continued
subsidy. It is concluded that there is no
compelling economic case for maintaining
such subsidies.
1, Introduction
Controversy over the public funding of British
nolfor-profit theatre'! arts continues to occupy
the attentions of arts professionals, politicians,
joumalists, and economists. It is a subject that
provokes stong reactions despite the
relatively small amount of money involved.
According to Lord Gowrie (Hore-Ruthven
1995), then Chairman of the Arts Council of
England, the Arts Council budget equals 0.06
per cent of toial public expenditure. If all
other cultural funds are included the figure is
[0.75 billion short of one per cent. By
contrast, the theake in the German city of
Berlin gets more state aid (f224 million) than
all the arts received in England (Staunton
I 996). Continuing attention has been drawn to
an increasing number of threatened or actual
theatre closures (Billington 1996, Coveney
1996), and regarding national opera, to
suggestions from the current Culture Minister
(Chris Smith) that the Royal Opera and the
English National Opera should merge
facilities. Govemment support for the arts in
England over recent years is set out in Table
1. Whilst there has been a recent decline
(1992193 ro 1996/97), this has masked
changing regional priorities such that many
regional theatres have had a growth in real
subsidy from the Arts Council over the period
1986-1995 (Feist et at 1996, p.1l).
Overlaying this debate is controversy over
the nature of the distribution of National
Lottery 'good causes' disbursements for the
arts. These were initially only perrnifted to
support capital projects3, yet disbibuted in a
sector dogged by inadequate revenue streams.
Furthemore, accusations of elitism continue
to be levelled against the subsidised theatre,
particularly by those who advocate more
independent comm€lcial solutions to cover
revenue shortfalls on 'serious' or 'legitimate'
theahe. Examples include increasing
commercial sponsorship, cross-subsidisation
from extended traditional pantomime seasons
(Cameron 1993), or the recent case of the
Royal National Theatre. They were noted as
declaring to stage a revival of the musical
'Guys and Dolls' at the Olivier Theatre,
instead of the originally planned diet of
classical, renaissance, and Shakespearean
plays, for primarily commercial, as opposed
to artistic reasons (Billington 1996).
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Table 1: Govemment support for the arts in England (f,m, 1993/94 prices)
Year
r979/80
1980/81
r98t/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985i86
1986/87
1987/88
Grant
125.0
119.0
123.2
130.4
128.6
130.0
r29.2
169.0
164.5
Year
1988/89
1989/90
1990/9r
t991192
1992/93
1993t94
1994195
1995/96
1996/97
Grant
165.9
161.0
168.1
175.2
191.6
189.6
182.4
181.5
r77.l
Source: National Campaign for the Arts
An optimal level of subsidy for a given
number of performances coul4 in principle,
be determined. The level of subsidy that
maximised social welfare could be defined at
the point of intersection of the marginal social
cost and mafginal social benefit curves, but
such computation would inevitably be
frustrated by heavily subjective judgements,
particularly pertaining to the nature and extent
of the extemal corsumption benefits.
Altemative valuations of the benefits would
be likely to lead to markedly different
outcomes. ln order to fully justit/ a level of
public financial support, the not-for-profit
theatre afts would have to demonstrate social
welfare enhancement by a comparable or
greater amount than any alGmative allocation
of resources, where the benefits outweigh the
costs in terms of altematives foregone. This
paper questions whether the performing arts
begin to make a compelling case to this
effect.
The paper is organised as follows. Section
2 briefly reviews the economic theory
pertinent to an analysis of the seemingly
perpetual financial knife edge on which not-
for-profit British theates operat€. Sections 3
and 4 explore a number ofpopular assertions
levelled agairst state supported British theatre
with respect !o thefu efficiency in production,
and the alleged consumption benefits such
theahe arts are said io confer. Concluding
remarks are presented in the final section.
2, Economics of not-for-pmjit theatre
enterpfises: a brief outline
Not-for-profit theatre arts firms, like for-profit
theatre arts frms, mainly exist to supply
entertai nent. The key diffetence is that the
not-for-profit theatre may have acc€s$ to state
subsidies and voluntary price discrimination
(vpr) (ie asking individuals to volunteer to
pay (donate) an additional amount, which they
may, if the value of the production to thern
exceeds the ticket price. In this way noffor-
profit theatre arts frms can survive in
segrnents of the theate arts market which for-
profit theatres camot.
Whilst the marginal costs of a given theatre
production ztre v€ry low (once a staged
production is in performance, the cost of an
additional performance is low, and the cost of
admitting another individual to a below
capacity audience is close to zerQ, the fxed
costs (ie those costs uffelated to audience
size, namely rehearsing, directing,
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scenery/costume production), represent a very
large pmportion of the total costs for each
production. Indeed, as Hansmann (1981)
noles, for many typical not-for-profit theate
productions the demand curve lies below the
average cost curve at all points, so that there
exists no ticket price for which total
admission receipts will cover total costs. In
such a case there is reliance from the outset
on subsidies and vpr, in addition to eamed
income. Whether sufflcient effort is given to
developing greater eamed income in the
presence of state subsidies and vpr, is, of
course, a key point of contention. Whelan
(1990) asserts that there is considerable
production inefficiency and managenal slack
(X-inefficiency) largely as a result of the
frequendy held aloft banner of 'artistic
freedom' contributing to insufficient
monitoring of subsidy recipients.
Since not-for-profit theahe arts enterprises
could be expecGd to be dominated by life-
long a.rts professionals devoted io their art,
one might reasonably expect an emphasis on
performance quality for such firms. Such an
objective is more likely to compl€ment the
arguments in their own managerial utility
functions (to the presumed exclusion of profit
related objectives). Hence, in Hansmann's
(1981) model of the not-for-profit theatre arts
firm, quality is a possible objective to be
maximised subject to a zero net revenue
constraint (since the firm is not-for-profit).
Quality relates to either (i) producing more
lavish productions (in terms of stage sets,
hiring exceptionally skilled star performers
etc.) or (ii) might also be interpreted in terms
of producing works of appeal to only 'highly
refined'tastes ie, less populist theatre. In
essence, for any given quality level, a quality
maximiser selects the audience size that
maximises its net revenue which it can then
use to purchase more quality. Altemative
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formulations of not-for-profit theatre
objectives are also advanced relating to budget
maximisation and audience maximisation. In
the case of the former, a budget maximiser is
shown to operate at an audience/quality level
combination between that of the qualrty and
audience maximiser. For any given audience
size, the audience maximiser will choose that
level of quality that maximises net revenue,
since those monies can then be used to reduce
ticket prices, which will subsequently attract
a larger audience. Such an objective, perhaps,
relates most closely to more altruistic
motivations for the enterprise, in widening
iastes for theatre arts among the general
population. Though as Austen-Smith (1994)
points out with recourse to a number of
audience surveys, that amongst economists,
..iedistribution of resources solely on the
grounds of taste is generally considered
illegitimate. This is especially so when
the redistribution favours a relatively
wealthy and well-educatedminority as in
the case of arts. (p.239)
The relevance of Hansmann's model to the
question of continued public financial support
for not-for-profit theatre is that it suggests the
main economic justification for a subsidy
relates to the very high fixed costs. In the
absence of a subsidy, such enterprises may be
compelled to set ticket prices too high to
satisBr marginal criteria for economic
effrciency, making them unviable. That said,
though a subsidy may help facilitate efficient
pricing, the equity versas efficiency conllict
would persist. The rrdividuals who consume
the performances supported by the subsidy
will almost inevitably be a very small
proportion of the population who paid for
them. Theatre audiences have a greater than
average proportion of socio-economic groups
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AB and Cl, and opera audiences are
predominantly group AB (The Economist
1994). This inequity might be counteractedby
some form of direct consumer subsidy such as
a voucher syster4 but how they would be
distributed to genuine potential low rncome
theatregoers (without the op'porhmity for
selling the acquired tickets on to others)
without high transaction costs is a senous
diffrculty. From a public choice perspective,
Peacock (1968) has argued that continued
subsidy, ostensibly orientated to the
preferences of a cultural elite, might simply
be a consequence of the focus of the subsidy
reflecting the preferences of the choosers - in
this UK case the Arts Council (who are also
contracted to act as the distibutors of
National Lottery arts monies). He suggests
that in order io avoid this, the membership of
such bodies should be regularly changed and
be socio-economically heterogenous.
There also exists a school of thought
advancing a labour productivity argument for
theahe subsidies. In essence. it has been
advanced by Baumol and Bowen (1976) that
because live perfonnance is technologically
resistant to consant labour-saving irmovation,
ie,. to continuous increases in labour
productivity, then such enterprises will be
exposed over time to 'Baumol's cost disease'.
This phenomenon relates to a tendency for the
output of the non-progressive sectors of an
economy to decline and possibly vanish. A
simple algebraic exposition of this
phenomenon is presented in the Appendix.
Intuitively theatre arts would seem to feature
in such a sector since there appears at fust
siglt very little scope for increasing
productivity (beyond reducing cast sizes,
which has been observed over time (Baumol
1997) without reducing quality of
fundamentally changing the pmduct. For
example, removing Iago from a production of
Othello would reduce labour inputs, but also
deshoy the product. Live music in theatre
could be replaced by pre-recorded music, but
would change the nature of the product. Yel
whilst some limited support, with recent data,
for the existence of this cost disease is
provided by Gapinski (1984), Peacock et al
(1982) failed to find a single example of
Baumol's cost disease in the UK. Cowen
(1996) suggests that the statistical €vidence
offered in support of the cost-disease thesis
does not address the relevant empirical issues.
He argues that these studies do not measure
productivity accurately for three reasons,
rurmely:
(a) not accounting for increases in product
quality;
(b) not accounting for increases in
diversity;
(c) cost disease studies are unduly biased
towards high culhre pursuits (opera,
theahe, symphony orchestras) and neglect
curent 'culhral wirmers' such as rock and
roll, heavy metal, rap, rave and counb:y
music.
He points to the fact that live performance has
not declined in general, even if specific kinds
of live performance have fallen out of favour.
Cowen and Grier (1996) provide altemative
ernpirical tests of productivity in the arts
showing artist numbers increasing as a
percentage of the population and total labour
force, eamings rising faster than the national
average, and artists enjoying superior
educational opportunities over time.
3, Argammts over continued sahsidies - the
prcrluction side
3.1 Does the theatre produce too many
unwanted productions?
Subsidising the theatre inevitably leads to free
market overproduction, but it has been argued
that such overproduction is socially necessary
to serve the option demand for particular
types of produetions. As Cameron (1993)
contends,
... people should be given the opportunity
to consume a wide variety of cultural
outputs whether or not they appear to
want them- If the opportunities do not
exist, there is no way to cultivate a taste
for them. A taste for Pinter is rurlikely to
be developed from a diet of musicals if
there is no opporhrnity to see Pinter.
(p.183)
There is no satisfactory evidence on the extent
of option demand. Accordingly this argument
does not seem readily capable of being used
to inform decisions about subsidising
performances of works that only a relatively
small number of people seem actually to want
to attend. Indeed Whelan (1990) argues that
in the case of the Royal Shakespeare
Company (RSC) there is an abuse of its
subsidy by virnre of the fact they are putting
on 'unpopular' plays. Certainly, it does seem
that the option demand argument may be
reinforcing an unduly patemalistic resource
reallocation purely on the grounds of taste.
Further, the argument neglects, or may even
help justify the diversion of resources away
from school education which must play a fal
more critical role in developing refined
cultural tastes. If schools are successful, more
refined audience tastes should independently
evolve to such an extent that they can be
satisfied by demand-sensitive commercial
theatre. If they do not evolve, then subsidies
are arguably simply advancing another non-
compulsory means of fying to shape
individuals' cultural tastes to replicate those
of a much smaller fraction of the population,
who pereeive themselves as having more
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refined tastes.
3.2 More commercial sponsorship should be
used!
Commercial sponsorship is frequently held to
be a potential saviour in covering (fully or
partially) the
overproduction
of free market
the concomitant
inadequate revenue streams. If the shadow
pnce of public funding of theatre arts is high,
then a greater share of the burden being
carried by commercial sponsorship would be
economically desirable in welfare terms. Yet
potential sponsors clearly have commercial
objectives which have an impact on the focus
of their sponsorship agenda, such as
promohng company names (especially after
changes) and logos among 'opinion formers',
and promoting and differentiating individual
product brands (for example, see Tait (1997)
who discusses the relationship between the
Royal Shakespeare Company and Allied
Domecq). Sponsorship of theahe/opera
companies is thus not an example of pure
alkuism on the private sector's part, but
firmly a commercial transaction. Following
Simon (1969) and Reekie and Crook (1982)
let
PVn = S*o(I +r)/(r+k")
PVro = Sqn(I+r)(r+ks)
where PVn nd Pyse are, respectively, the
predicted present values of all present and
future net sales generated by advertising in
the current period via theatre sponsorship and
altemative promotion expenditures, such as
sport sponsorship or more newspaper and
television advertising.
So, and S",o are, respectively, the
increments in sales (net of all costs except
advertising) generated by theatre sponsorship
and allemative promotion expenditures in the
costs
and
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cuffent time period.
r = the firm's cost of capital
k* kr, = the assumed constant rate of
depreciation for each type of promotional
spendrng.
Computation of the above expressions would
enable some economic assessment to be made
of altemative advertising/marketing strate gies,
since strategies will differ in terms of their
awareness impact decay or depreciation
pattem. Overall one would expectP/o < PIl*
but though theatre sponsorship may be
forecast to have little immediate impact on
sales (and so a low ,9or), it may also have a
low value for k (due to, for example,
company logos remaining on lheatre
programmes, brochures, posters etc. oyer one
or more seasons). This suggests it could be
usefirl as a much longer term base element to
be embedded in a multiple rnedia advertising
or marketing strategy. On its own, however,
theatre sponsorship is unlikely to be able to
wholly cover any revenue shorfalls causedby
total subsidy withdrawal.
3.3 Why don't the commercial theatre and
television companies support the subsi.dised.
sector instedd of taxpa))erc?
It could be argued that one of London's main
attractions io domestic and foreign tourists is
the commercial theatres in the West End.
However, this ignores the contributions of the
National Theafre and the RSC, and the link
between subsidised and commercial theatre.
The West End has played host to productions
from the subsidised sector, one of the besi
known being Zes Mr'serables, which the RSC
co-produced. According to The Stage, on
average 2O productions a year in the West
End come from the subsidised sector @ield
1995). It has been argued that without the
subsidised sector, the standard of performance
in the West End would fall, as would
standards in the b,roadcast media, since the
latter ben€fit from the experiences of actors,
directors, and designers in subsidised theabes.
There is also a case for subsidy as a means of
promoting new writing by compensating for
risk, though perhaps too often national
subsidised theatr€s tend frequently to revisit
more lraditional works. That said. these
training-bed extemal economy linkages have
achieved some limited recognition in the
industry, with some commercial theatre profits
being ploughed back into the
regionaVsubsidised theatre by the Cameron
Mackintosh Foundation. No such formal
suppod is provided by the broadcast media.
Accordingly, there exists a case worthy of
further examination. for the inhoduction of a
hlpothecated tax on broadcast media and
commercial theabe profits to sustain this
naining activity, in the face of subsidy
diminution or withdrawal.
4, Argaments over continued subsidies - the
consumPtion side
Most of the arguments pertaining to the
purported extemal consumption benefits of
continuously subsidising theate are tenuous
and devoid of any robust empirical evidence.
Indeed many of these arguments are sorurdly
thrashed in Sawers (1993), but have regslarly
re-ernerged with a new spin as part of the
cases advanced by professionals seeking
funding ftom various sources fot local
economic development.
4-l Theatre subsidy helps local economic
regeneration !
The argument here is that theatre can be
viewed as part of a composite good of
residential and recreational experience, and
where the spillover effects of theatre directly
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benefit hotels, restaurants and bars. It is
argued that its presence may encoumge
inward inveshnent into an area and it has been
claimed that it may improve the quality of life
of an area making it a more desirable place to
live. These effects may well be true but there
is no unambiguously clear case why it should
be subsidised theatre acting as a tool of local
economic development. in support of the 'arts
as a magnet' argument, Myerscough (1988)
showed that 42 per cent of those interviewed
in Glasgow, 50 per cent of those interviewed
.in Merseyside an.d 24 per cent of those
interviewed in Ipswich regarded museums and
theahes as important for enjoying living and
working in the region. The lower figure
recorded for Ipswich is perhaps explained by
the number of theatres already existing in
those cities. In Glasgow there were 22 arts
venues with a total of 16,429 seats, in
Liverpool 11 venues with 10,788 seats and in
Ipswich 4 venues with 3,581 seats (Barbour
1994). Considered objectively, the supporting
evidence for this argument is decidedly feeble
and would only be snengthened if it could be
shown that enterprise was attracted as a
consequence (in itself more a case for local
rather thar national subsidy). In this regard
even Myerscough (1988) is reduced to wishful
thinking - 'Nobody could say for certain why
firms chose Glasgow. Stated reasons were not
alwaysithe real reasons and quality of life was
impossible to disentangle from other factors'
(!.136).
4.2 The subsidised theatre confers the psychic
benefits of prestige!
The perfoming axts may confer prestige upon
a county if they receive intemational
recognition, or upon a region if it receives
national recognition. The level of prestige
may be indicated by the decision of foreign
performers to join professional companies
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here. In itself this is not a strong case for
continued subsidy, and it is not clear why the
same consumption benefit is not also possible
from quality commercial theatre.
4.3 The subsidised theatre confers a bequest
value of culture for our children!
The argument here is that utility may be
derived from preserving the arts for future
generations. Although it is acknowledged that
the performing arts would not disappear
altogether if all subsidies were withdrawn, it
is contended that it would be difficult to re-
create a culh.[al tradition. Recent evidence
does not seem to support this assertion,
particulady given the development of the
Globe theatre in London by Sam Wannamaker
and others, and the revival of music on period
instruments. Further, one might argue that
innbvation in theatfe has been stifled by
hadition, and that the subsidised theatre is a
main culprit in continually revisitlng
haditional works at the experse of the new.
4.4 Subsidising the performing arts can help
displace social costs!
In the same way as a liberal education is said
to benefit society, it is argued that arts do
likewise. This argument is developed further
by Scitovsky (1983) who suggests tlnt the
great arts sadsry a craving for excitement.
Should the arts become more popular they
would, it is argued, displace other outlets for
this craving, possibly replacing gambling or
crime. Suspending any doubts we may have
about the substifutability of ballet attendance
for gambling orjoy'iding, there is not a single
shred of evidence that the arts reduce crime,
or in any other way reduce negative
extemalities, or produce positive extemalities
from behaviour modification. Further, the
social cost displacement thesis need not be
addressed by arts subsidies at all. One might
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consider substituting the arts in Scitovsky's
argument with boxing, or rock music, or
religion as alternative outlets for combatting
potential youth misbehaviour, and thus being
equally worthy of subsidy.
5. Concluding rcmarks
Whilst the subsidisation of the performing arts
may be regarded as an investnent, attention
should be given to the opportunity cost of
those public funds, and the scope for
displacement of public financial support by
the privaie sector. Whilst the consumption-
benefits case for continued theatre subsidy
seems generally very weak, inevitably
subsidisation leads to an increased level of
output requiring more labour and therefore
yielding more tax income. It is not clear,
however, how many jobs exist because of
subsidisation, thus taking the total tax income
from this s€ctor (as some have done) would
greatly exaggerate the retum to govenment.
The subsidised theatre makes some very
minor contribution to the UK balance of
payments, and by attracting tourists, also
contributes to the invisible exports account.
Looking at the potential effects of subsidy
withdrawal, studies of individual companies
are more reliable, but can sedously overstate
the losses to the Treasury depending on the
accrnacy of the assumed employment and
expenditure multipliers (For examples of such
shldies see National Campaign for the Artsq
1995). Inevitably in these studies the
opportunity cost of the arts subsidy is
qpically not given any consideration.
A key objection to firnding the arts is that
the benefits accrue to a small proportion of
the population. If the vague extemal
consumption benefits of the arts are ignored
for the moment, the net effect of subsidisation
is a redistribution of income to the rich In the
absence of some kind of voucher scheme.
subsidising ticket prices will only affect the
socio-economic composition of the audience
if the demand for the arts is elastic, or the
perception of the arts charge.
It has also been argued that the theatre
would not need a subsidy if it was more
efficient, and simply put on less unpopular
plays. The existence of high fxed costs and
the objective of serving option demand may
well, however, frustrate pure market solutions
to the production of 'serious' or 'legitimate'
theatre. A hypothecated tax on commercial
theatre and broadcast media profits could be
used to address this problem were it deemed
sufficiendy serious to merit political action.
The conventional wisdom remains that
subsidy drives up wage bills and allows
monopoly suppliers to raise their prices".
Various shrdies have concluded that the
gain fiom subsidising the arts outweighs the
cost. Gapinski (1984) concluded that the RSC
giv€s a benefit-cost ratio of 1.18, ie. every f,l
of subsidy rehrms f,1.18 in benefits. Forrest,
Grime and Woods (1995) used the Clawson-
Knetsch travel cost methodr in their study of
the Royal Exchange Manchester, and found a
benefit-cost ratio of 1.083. The findings of
these studies do not take account of the
potential retums elsewhere with those funds,
nor consider the scope for private sector
involvement. Yet even though not necessarily
socially optimal (particularly with respect to
the distributional impact of the subsidy), some
level of subsidy can be shown to be
economicallyjustified, but only in the nanow
institutional context of the status quo.
In short, the case for continued arts subsidy
is certarnly not compelling, especially with
regard to the alleged external conswnption
benefits. and the absence of real evidence
presenied for the persistence of Baumol's cost
disease. Further, given the history of public
services of much greater social and economic
significance that have been subjected to
privatization and deregulation, some
experimentation of subsidy withdrawal with,
say, the Royal Opera House, and auctioning it
in the private sector, seems hardly radical.
Endnotes
1. University of Portsmouth. The authors are
grateful to an anonynous referee for
extensive cornments on an eadier version
of this paper. Any remaining errors are
their own responsibility.
2. Nolfor-profit theatres are taken to include
national theatre and opera companies,
municipal/local/regional theatres, and
provincial repenory companies
3, Tait (1996) and Meikle (1996) point to
movement towards particular American
practices in arts funding namely
stabilization funding (possibly involving an
initial one-offpayment to wipe out current
debts) and talent funds. The former relates
to the distribution to each not-for-profit
theate of monies for a reserve firnd'to be
used as insulation from unexpected
shortfalls in their 'working capital'. This
approach is an attempt to retain incentives
for efficiency as the theahe still faces a
hard budget constraint. Talent firnds relate
to monies for the development and
maintenance of premium theatrical skills,
or to address particular skills deficits.
4. Spooner (1995) attempts to rebut this view
by pointing out that the 1000 employees in
the Royal Opera House (ciled h The
Economist (1995) as guilty of serious
overmanning), included the corps de ballet
of the Royal Ballet, the Opera Chorus, the
orchestra, and the technical staff (eaming
the ROH over f,1m by hiring out
productions). The rebuttal is not that
convincinE to the authofs.
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5. The Clawson-Knetsch method recognises
that potential users of a recreational
facility face different generalised costs if
havel cosls are included. The effects of
distance on the usage of the facility can be
examined and a demand curve for the
entire recreational experience (ioumey and
tickets) estimated (the Clawson demand
curve). From the demand curve the
consumer surplus may then be calculated.
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Appendix - The labour prodactiviq, argument
for thedre sabsidies
Assume there are two sectors in the economy, In
sector 1 the productivity oflabour is constant, in
sector 2 output per person grows cumulatively at
a constant compounded rate (r). Using Baumol's
(1967) notation the output at time r is as
follows:
Yu = alu
Y", = bl.,e''
where a ard 6 are constants. Suppose that wages
are equal in the two sectors at a level I/, and the
wage rate indeases with productivity increases
in sector 2. From this we can sho.w that costs in
sector I (the unprogressive sector) will rise
without limit while in sector 2 costs will stav
conslafi:
C, = Wt r/Y" = Wd'Llah,: W{la
Cr = Wt rlYr, = W{L2|bLr/ : Wlb
-29-
